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It is common practice in the publishing industry for a publisher to agree to
print a well-established author's next book long before it is written-often,
indeed, before the author has more to show than a one- or two-page prospec-
tus. What is more, these agreements commonly award the author a large
advance against prospective royalties and occasionally commit the publisher
as well to a large promotion budget or first printing. Such contracts raise an
obvious question: Why do publishers not wait until they have read and evalu-
ated the completed manuscript before committing themselves to invest heavily
in its publication? Nor is the publishing industry the only arena in which
investors leap before they look. Venture capitalists often leave voting control
over a start-up firm with an entrepreneur who invests relatively little money of
his own. Similarly, limited partners in a venture capital fund often commit
themselves in advance to invest in all the fund's future projects rather than
reserve the right to evaluate those projects after the fund's managers have
proposed them.
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In this article we develop a simple intuition to explain this phenomenon.
When two parties invest at different times during the development of a com-
mon project, the first investor is vulnerable to the risk that the second will
opportunistically withhold her investment. In particular, if the parties expect
to share the payout from the project and if, after the first party has invested,
the second party learns that the project will be less successful than originally
anticipated, the second party has an incentive to withhold investment when-
ever the cost of investing would exceed her revised estimate of her share of the
project's returns. Such a unilateral decision to withhold investment will be
inefficient if the project's total expected payout remains sufficient to justify the
second party's investment. The problem is that the party who invests second
may not consider the project's total payout. Rather, she has an incentive to
weigh the cost of her investment only against her own expected return and to
neglect the return to the first party, whose investment is already sunk. If the
risk of such an opportunistic decision to withhold investment is large enough,
both parties have an incentive to write a contract ex ante to compel the second
party's investment regardless of what she may subsequently learn about the
project's prospects. We term such contracts "hands-tying contracts."
It is by now a familiar observation (e.g., Jensen and Meckling) that the
equity shareholders in a firm financed partly with debt have an incentive to
engage in inefficiently speculative projects since they receive a disproportion-
ate share of any upside gains while the bondholders bear a disproportionate
share of downside losses. Bond covenants constraining the firm's ability to
increase the riskiness of its investments are frequently drafted with this prob-
lem in mind (Smith and Warner). The situation examined here is in a sense the
reverse case: Where the persons in control will participate disproportionately
in downside losses, they have an excessive incentive to avoid risky but valu-
able projects; consequently, constraints on their discretion to reject investments
are called for.
In Sections 2 and 3, we present a simple model to explore the hands-tying
intuition, using a stylized account of book publishing as an illustration. In
Section 4, we examine further details of publishing contracts from the per-
spective of the hands-tying model. In Section 5, we explore hands-tying in
other contractual contexts, including venture capital financing, oil and gas
exploration, and secured debt.
2. A Model
Imagine a situation in which one individual (whom we shall term, for ease of
reference, the "entrepreneur") contracts with another (the "investor") to
undertake a project. The entrepreneur has unique skills in project development
that the investor lacks. However, the entrepreneur has no funds of his own to
invest; the capital required by the project must be supplied by the investor. 1 (In
Section 3, we relax the assumption that there is only one potential investor.)
1. The model would lead to similar results if, in place of this wealth constraint, we were to
assume that the entrepreneur is more risk averse than the investor.
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The project must proceed in two stages. In the first stage, the entrepreneur
expends effort to develop the project preparatory to production. In the second
stage, the investor invests capital in production. In our prototypical example,
the entrepreneur is an author, the investor a publisher, and the project is the
writing and publication of a novel. In the first stage, the author writes the
book; in the second stage, the publisher invests in printing and promoting the
book.
The project can have either of two outcomes: good or bad. A good outcome
has a dollar value v = v. > I, where I is the (fixed) amount the investor must
invest in production. A bad outcome has a value v = vb < I. The entrepreneur
has a choice between two different levels of effort: Either he can expend no
effort, in which case the outcome will always be bad, or he can expend a fixed
positive amount of effort on which he places a dollar value of e, in which case
there will be a probability of q, 1 > q > 0, that the outcome will be good and
a probability of 1 - q that it will be bad.
The investor is unable to observe whether the entrepreneur has expended
effort. However, after the entrepreneur (allegedly) expends effort, and before
the investor invests, the investor receives a costless but noisy signal s
indicating the likelihood that the outcome of the project will be good. This
signal can take either of two values: sg or sb. If the outcome of the project will
be good, the signal will take value Sg with probability r and value sb with
probability 1 - r; similarly, if the outcome of the project will be bad, the
signal will take value sb with probability r and value s. with probability 1 - r.
That is, p(s = sglv = v8) = p(s = sbIv = vb) = r, where .5 -- r -- 1. When
r = .5 the signal contains no information, while if r = 1 the signal gives a
perfect forecast of the outcome of the project. We shall refer to r as the
reliability of the investor's signal.2 After receiving her signal, the investor has
the opportunity to decide whether or not to invest in the project. If she decides
to reject the project, it will have value v = 0.
Finally, the investor and entrepreneur each seek only to maximize their
expected returns (an assumption we make both to simplify exposition and to
emphasize that our analysis does not depend on risk aversion).
All of the preceding is common knowledge to the investor and en-
trepreneur, except that in any given case the investor cannot observe whether
the entrepreneur has actually expended effort and the entrepreneur cannot
observe the investor's signal.
These assumptions track the basic characteristics of book publishing. A
publisher generally cannot observe the amount of effort that an author puts
into writing a book. Once the book is written, however, the publisher can read
the completed manuscript. This reading permits the publisher to make a more
refined estimate of the book's prospects, which corresponds to the signal in
our model. Yet this signal will seldom yield a completely reliable forecast of
the book's future success. Moreover, because the forecast is subjective, it is
not observable by the author.
2. We assume p(s = sglv = vg) = p(s = sblv = vb) only for simplicity.
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2.1 Efficient Outcomes
As a starting point, consider the first-best outcome that maximizes the joint
return to the investor and entrepreneur combined.
There are three potentially efficient sets of actions that the parties can take.
First, the entrepreneur expends no effort and the investor does not invest. The
expected joint return is then 0. Second, the entrepreneur expends effort and
the investor invests regardless of the value taken by her signal. The expected
joint return is then
qvg + (1- q)vb - - e. (1)
Third, the entrepreneur expends effort and the investor invests only if s = s8.
The expected joint return is then
qr(v, - ) + (1 - q)(1 - r)(vb - I) - e. (2)
(Details of these and other calculations are presented in the Appendix.)
It will be efficient for the entrepreneur to expend effort if and only if either
expression (1) > 0 or expression (2) > 0. We shall assume throughout that
one or both of these conditions is met-that is, that it is always efficient for
the entrepreneur to expend effort. Given this, it will be efficient to condition
the investor's investment on the receipt of a good signal (s = sg) if and only if
expression (2) > expression (1), which is equivalent to
-(1 - q)r(vb - 1) > q(1 - r)(vg - 1). (3)
Intuitively, condition (3) states that, for the signal to be worth acting on, the
expected value of the bad outcomes avoided by acting on the signal must be
greater than the expected value of the good outcomes that are mistakenly
rejected.
As we shall demonstrate, this first-best outcome can be achieved through a
properly designed contract between the investor and the entrepreneur. But the
form that this contract must take will depend on r. For some values of r the
parties will wish to leave the investor free to act on her signal-that is, they
will contract without hands-tying-or, alternatively, they will wish to
postpone contracting until after the entrepreneur has performed and the inves-
tor receives her signal. For the values of r in which we are particularly
interested, however, the contract must have just the opposite characteristics to
achieve a first-best outcome. First, it must be entered into before the en-
trepreneur expends effort. Second, it must commit the investor to invest
regardless of the value taken by her signal-that is, it must tie the investor's
hands. In terms of our book-publishing example, this means that the author
and the publisher must enter into a contract before the author writes the book
and that the contract must commit the publisher to publish the book regardless
of the assessment she makes of the book's likely profitability when she reads
the completed manuscript.
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We establish these two characteristics of an efficient hands-tying contract in
reverse order. First, in the remainder of Section 2, we simply assume that the
investor and entrepreneur enter into a contract prior to the entrepreneur's
expenditure of effort and show when it will be efficient to put a hands-tying
term in that contract. Then, in Section 3, we show when and why it is efficient
to contract in advance of the entrepreneur's expenditure of effort.
We assume that the investor and entrepreneur cannot write an enforceable
contract that is conditioned on outcomes that they cannot both observe. Thus,
they cannot condition their contracts on the amount of effort expended by the
entrepreneur or on the value taken by the investor's signal. They can, how-
ever, condition their contractual commitments on any outcome that is mutu-
ally observable. We shall generally not be concerned here with the particular
methods by which the terms of contracts are enforced-whether by court-
ordered d-mages and injunctions, by reputation, or by other sanctions. In a
simple situation such as that modeled here, a hands-tying provision should be
easily enforceable because it will be obvious if the investor violates the
provision by refusing to invest. In more complicated settings-as where there
are multiple signals of varying reliability that are difficult to distinguish-it
may not be feasible to put an enforceable hands-tying provision in a contract.
In that case, the parties must either enter into a contract without hands-tying
or else forgo contracting entirely. Which of these they should choose depends
on whether expression (2) is greater than zero. For the remainder of our
analysis, however, we simply assume that hands-tying agreements are always
enforceable.
2.2 Contracting with Hands-Tying
We begin by considering the contracts that the parties can make in which the
investor ties her hands-that is, commits herself to invest regardless of the
value taken by her signal.
The entrepreneur's compensation cannot be directly tied to his (unobserva-
ble) effort level. Rather, it can be conditioned only on the observed project
outcome, which can be either good or bad. It follows that the only way to
motivate the entrepreneur is to give him a share in the returns from good
outcomes that is large enough to increase his expected compensation by at
least e if he expends effort. (We assume that the entrepreneur's concern for his
future reputation is in itself insufficient to induce the efficient level of effort.
More precisely, we assume that e reflects the portion of the entrepreneur's
effort that cannot be motivated by reputational concerns.)
Let the return paid the entrepreneur be wg if the realized outcome is good
and w. if it is bad. Because the entrepreneur has no wealth of his own, it is
necessary that Wg,wb - 0. It follows that the minimum amounts that the
investor can pay the entrepreneur and still retain an incentive for the en-
trepreneur to expend effort are (as demonstrated in the Appendix)
wb = 0, wg = e/q.
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(For simplicity, we assume throughout that the entrepreneur can be induced to
contract by offering him terms, such as these, whose expected value just
equals his opportunity cost of effort e. Thus, all surplus goes to the investor.3 )
The investor's expected return is then
qvg + (1 - q)v, - I - e. (5)
This is the same as the net social return (1), reflecting the assumption that the
investor captures all surplus.
2.3 Contracting without Hands-Tying
Now consider the contracts that can be formed if the investor wishes to retain
and exercise the right to reject a project if her signal is bad-that is, if s = sb.
In this case, there are three observable results on which the entrepreneur's
wage can be conditioned: (a) the investor invests and the outcome is good; (b)
the investor invests and the outcome is bad; (c) the investor refuses to invest.
Denote the compensation given the entrepreneur in these eventualities, re-
spectively, as hg, wb, and 0,, where gfb,n -- 0.
In this case, the minimum terms that can be offered the entrepreneur,
subject to the constraint of inducing effort, are
W, = wb = 0, ,g = e/qr. (6)
(See the Appendix.) Comparison of (6) with (4) indicates that the investor
must increase the entrepreneur's return from a successful project by a factor of
llr if she does not tie her hands. This is necessary to offset the expected loss
that the entrepreneur would otherwise incur because, by acting on her imper-
fectly reliable signal, the investor will reject some projects that would have
turned out to be good, and the entrepreneur will thus lose his share of the
expected returns from those projects. (Since the investor bears all the losses if
the project turns out to be bad, the entrepreneur gains nothing from the fact
that, by acting on her signal, the investor can reject some projects that would
in fact be bad. Thus, for any given wages, the entrepreneur will always be
worse off if the investor acts on her signal.)
Given the entrepreneur's terms in (6), the investor's expected return without
hands-tying is
qr(vg - I) + (1 - q)(1 - r)(v, - 1) - e, (7)
which is equal to the social return (2).
3. To be sure, in author-publisher contracting, where the most likely source of rents is the
author's peculiar genius, most rents may well accrue to the author.
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2.4 When Does Hands-Tying Pay?
The investor will be willing to tie her hands if (5) > (7), which is equivalent to
-q(1 - r)(vg - 1) < (1 - q)r(vb - 1). (8)
This is the same as condition (3), and has the same interpretation. As an aid to
analysis, we can rewrite (8) as a condition on the value of r:
r < q(v, - I) rmx(9
q(v - I) - (1 - q)(v b - I)
That is, given values for q, vg, and vb, hands-tying can benefit the investor
only when the reliability of her signal is less than the expression on the right-
hand side of (9), which we shall term rm, -
Condition (9) is, however, only a necessary and not a sufficient condition
for hands-tying. A hands-tying provision is important only if, in its absence,
the investor would choose to act on her signal. As shown in the Appendix, the
investor will ignore her signal in any case unless it has at least the minimum
level of reliability given by
q(g - I) - e (10)
q(vg - I) - (1 - q)(v - ) - e n
That is, an investor who has not tied her hands will reject a project only when
r > rmin. If r < rmin, the investor will invest even after observing s = st
because her signal is too unreliable to prompt her to act on it despite her
excessive incentive to reject projects.
Written in terms of the reliability of the investor's signal, the necessary and
sufficient conditions for a contract to have a strictly larger expected joint
surplus when it has a hands-tying term than when it does not are therefore
rmm > r > rmin. If r is in this range, then it will be jointly profitable for the
investor and entrepreneur if the investor invests in all projects regardless of
the value of her signal. Nevertheless, the investor will have an incentive to
reject projects for which she receives a bad signal since, in deciding whether
to invest, she will have an incentive to ignore the entrepreneur's share of the
returns from good projects.
So long as q,e > O, vg > I, and v,, < I, it will always be the case that
rm. > rmin-that is, there will always be a range of values of r for which
hands-tying is worthwhile. Moreover, increasing e, ceteris paribus, reduces
rmin without changing rm , and thus expands the range of values for r for
which hands-tying is advantageous. This is because a larger e requires that the
entrepreneur be promised a larger share of the returns from a successful
project to cover his cost of effort, and hence gives the investor a stronger
incentive to reject a project with positive expected joint returns.
4
4. In this simple model, the contract entered into by the parties will always assure a first-best
outcome. That is, the parties will include or omit a hands-tying term in their contract if and only if
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Table 1. A Numerical Example of Outcomes Based on Different Actions by Investor
(a) (b) (c)
Joint Surplus Joint Surplus Investor's Surplus
from Ignoring from Using from Using Signal
r Signal Signal After Agreeing Not To
.50 20 -5 10
.60 20 5 17
.64 (rain) 20 9 20
.70 20 15 24
.75 (r,) 20 20 28
.80 20 25 31
.90 20 35 38
1.00 20 45 45
These results can be illustrated with a simple numerical example. Assume
that e = 30, I = 50, vb = 0, vg = 200, and q = .5. Then, from (9) and (10),
rm. = .75 and rmin = .64. Table 1 shows the surplus potentially available to
the parties as r takes different values between .5 and 1. Column (a) gives the
joint surplus [expressions (1) and (5)] when the investor invests regardless of
her signal. Column (b) gives the joint surplus [expressions (2) and (7)] when
the investor invests only on a good signal. Column (c) gives the private
surplus [expression (A9) in the Appendix] that the investor would receive if
she were to cheat on a hands-tying contract-that is, if she were to reject
projects with a bad signal after agreeing not to [so that the entrepreneur's
terms of compensation are those given by expression (6)]. Comparing col-
umns (a) and (b), we see that the joint surplus is maximized by ignoring the
investor's signal when r < rmn. Comparing columns (a) and (c), we see that
the investor has a private incentive to act on her signal whenever r > rmin -
Thus, for r between rm~x and rmin, a hands-tying contract is necessary.5 When
r = .70, the joint surplus increases from 15 to 20, or 33 percent, if a hands-
tying contract is used; when r = .64, a hands-tying contract more than
doubles the joint surplus.
2.5 Application to Publishing Contracts
In applying these results to publishing contracts, we must keep in mind that r
should be interpreted not as the reliability of the publisher's overall estimate
of a book's likely success, but rather as the reliability of the refinement of that
ex ante estimate that can be obtained by reading the completed manuscript.
the resulting contract will induce them to take the actions appropriate to achieve a joint profit
maximum. As a consequence, the initial contract is renegotiation-proof: Both when it contains a
hands-tying term and when it does not, the parties have no incentive to renegotiate its terms after
the investor receives her signal.
5. For r > r., the efficient contract leaves the investor free to act on her signal while
adjusting the entrepreneur's terms of compensation to those given by expression (6), so that the
investor's private return from acting on her signal is not that given by column (c) but rather the
same as the social return in column (b).
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With a well-established writer, such as a successful author of popular
fiction, a publisher can often make a good forecast of the sales prospects for
the author's next book without reading the manuscript. The author's reputa-
tion, when combined with general knowledge about the state of the economy
and about the types of books that are currently popular, will provide a strong
basis for a forecast, both because the author's reputation reflects his skills and
ambitions and because that reputation is itself an important reason why people
will buy the book. The additional predictive accuracy afforded by the pub-
lisher's reading of the completed manuscript is likely to be relatively modest.
6
Put in terms of our model, r may be less than rmax . Consequently, the author's
and publisher's joint profits will be maximized by deciding whether and how
much to invest in printing and promoting the book without regard to the
publisher's impressions from reading the manuscript. Yet, if the publisher's
hands are not tied in this regard, her reading of the manuscript may well leave
her with an incentive either to refuse to publish or, more likely, to invest less
in printing and promotion than is required for maximum joint profitability.
7
(Where, as is common in publishing, the contract does not call for the pub-
lisher to invest a fixed amount I in printing and promotion, as is assumed in
our model, but rather gives the publisher some discretion over the size of the
investment, the model is best interpreted as applying to the publisher's deci-
sion whether to invest another dollar at the margin, and hence to the pub-
lisher's decision about how much to invest.)
With an unestablished author, on the other hand, the publisher's reading of
the completed manuscript will generally permit an important refinement in her
estimate of a book's likely success. Indeed, it may be her only source of
information. In terms of the model, r > rmax . A hands-tying contract would
therefore require that valuable information be discarded.
In short, as an author's reputation grows, the reliability of the incremental
predictive information that a publisher obtains from reading the author's
manuscripts declines. It is therefore not surprising that hands-tying provisions
are generally found only in contracts with well-established authors and that,
as discussed further in Section 4, these provisions grow stronger in proportion
to the author's reputation.
Finally, to avoid confusion, it is important to note that the variable q in our
model, which gives the probability of a good outcome v., cannot be in-
terpreted as an index of how well established an author is. Rather, as seen in
6. Contrary to popular wisdom, large advances offered to prominent authors are regarded by
insiders as among the least risky publishing investments (e.g., Turbide:52; Nixon). As one
commentator observes of authors such as James Clavell, Stephen King, Tom Clancy, and Danielle
Steel: "In a business of no guarantees, they are guaranteed" (Nixon:16). "Mid-list" authors are
regarded as riskier investments by publishers, despite their far lower advances, and first-time
authors are seen as riskier still.
7. Moreover, this problem will be accentuated if the strong salience of a completed manu-
script tempts publishers who have not tied their hands to give too much weight to their reading of
the manuscript, and too little to the author's general reputation, in estimating the likely success of
a published book.
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conditions (3) and (8), q has meaning only in relation to the relative magni-
tude of the other variables I, e, vg, and vb, all of which will be quite different
for established versus unestablished authors.
2.6 The Role of Moral Hazard
The model developed here assumes double moral hazard: The entrepreneur's
effort is unobservable by the investor and the investor's signal is unobservable
by the entrepreneur. Moral hazard on the part of the entrepreneur is not
necessary to motivate hands-tying, however.
In our model, the assumption that the entrepreneur's effort is unobservable
is important only because it provides a reason for compensating the en-
trepreneur with a share of gross receipts rather than with a fixed wage. It is
this sharing of receipts-or, more particularly, the asymmetric sharing of
receipts that results from the entrepreneur's wealth constraint and the sequen-
tial character of the entrepreneur's and the investor's investments-that cre-
ates the incentive for hands-tying. Consequently, any other consideration that
necessitates such a division of realized receipts would serve the same function
as the entrepreneur's moral hazard does in our model.
Moral hazard is, in fact, probably the most common reason why publishing
contracts, and the other types of contracts discussed in Section 5, provide for
sharing of receipts. There may, however, be other reasons as well. For exam-
ple, in the oil and gas limited partnerships discussed in Section 5, tax consid-
erations, rather than the need to motivate the entrepreneur, induce the asym-
metric sharing of returns that motivates hands-tying. Risk aversion on the part
of the investor could also provide a reason for sharing realized returns.
Moral hazard on the part of the investor, however, does play a critical role
in motivating hands-tying. Indeed, it is precisely the role of a hands-tying
provision to eliminate the investor's moral hazard by having her commit in
advance not to act on her signal. If the investor's signal were observable by
the entrepreneur, a hands-tying contract would be unnecessary. The parties
could simply walt until after the entrepreneur had performed and the investor
had received her signal before contracting. The entrepreneur could then insist
on a larger share of receipts when the signal is good than when it is bad. Such
an effort to contract after the entrepreneur expends effort will not provide an
adequate solution when the investor's signal is unobservable, however, as the
following section shows. 8
3. Why Contract Before the Investor Receives Her Signal?
We have assumed so far that the entrepreneur and the investor contract before
the investor receives her signal. If this were not the case, there would be no
8. Where, for reasons such as those suggested at the beginning of Section 3, there are reasons
for the investor and entrepreneur to contract in advance of the entrepreneur's effort that are
unrelated to the unobservability of the investor's signal, it is sufficient to motivate hands-tying
that the investor's signal simply be unverifiable to a third party and hence unavailable as a basis
for an enforceable contract; the signal need not also be unobservable to the entrepreneur.
638 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V8 N3
occasion for hands-tying. Thus we must ask: Why not wait? In the case of
book publishing, for example, why not enter into a contract after the book has
been written and the publisher has read the manuscript (as is, in fact, usually
done with unestablished authors)?
There are incentives for contracting in advance of the entrepreneur's effort
that are unrelated to the specific assumptions of our model. For example, a
book publisher may wish to capture the returns from contributing editorial
services during the writing of a book by committing the author in advance to a
lower rate of royalties upon the book's publication. Or an author may wish to
borrow funds to support himself while writing his book and, given that the
loan must be secured by the publishing rights to the book, a publisher-who
is in a better position than a bank to assess the prospects for the book and to
levy on its receipts-may be the least-cost lender. Or an author may simply be
risk averse and wish to have the publisher bear more of the risk that the
author's efforts at writing will turn out poorly.
There is, however, another incentive for contracting in advance that is
closely related to the considerations that motivate hands-tying. To understand
that incentive, let us return to our model. However, rather than assuming, as we
did earlier, that the contract is written before the entrepreneur expends effort,
suppose now that the entrepreneur develops the project first, without a contract,
and subsequently seeks to deal with the investor. The investor can therefore
observe her signal before entering into a contract with the entrepreneur.
We focus on the case in which rmin < r < r~ x . We have already shown
that, in this case, if a contract is written in advance of the investor's signal,
hands-tying is worthwhile. We now show that the investor and the en-
trepreneur also have an incentive to write the contract in advance of the signal.
We first consider the situation in which, as before, there is only a single
entrepreneur and a single investor; we then consider the situation in which
there are many competing investors.
3.1 Single Investor and Entrepreneur
Given that rm0i < r < rmax, it is jointly profitable for the entrepreneur to
expend effort and for the investor to invest in all projects regardless of the
value taken by her signal. If the investor and entrepreneur contract after the
investor receives her signal, however, the only contract terms on which they
will be able to agree will induce the investor to invest only in projects on
which she receives a good signal. Consequently, contracting will be inefficient
and the parties, recognizing this, will have an incentive to write their contract
in advance of the investor's signal.
To see this, assume the contrary-that is, that there exist contract terms that
will induce the entrepreneur to expend effort and that will induce the investor
to invest in projects that produce bad as well as good signals. Since the
investor can observe her signal before contracting, she has the opportunity to
select different contract terms depending on the value of her signal. Denote by
(wg,w,) the contract terms agreed to when the investor's signal is good (the
good-signal contract), where w9 (wi) is the payment that the entrepreneur
receives when the outcome of the project is good (bad). Similarly, denote by
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(Wb_,Wb), the payment terms offered by the investor when her signal is bad (the
bad-signal contract).
These terms must be chosen so that the entrepreneur's expected returns
from developing a project are sufficient to cover his cost of effort, that is,
pI[qgwI + (1 - qI)wI] + pb[qbw~g + (1 - qb)wbb] = e, (11)
where p9 (pb) denotes the probability that the investor will get a good (bad)
signal on a randomly selected project, and q9 (qb) denotes the probability that
a project will have a good outcome given that the investor gets a good (bad)
signal. (As before, we assume for simplicity that all rents go to the investor.)
It is necessary that w. = Wb = 0; otherwise, the entrepreneur would have a
positive expected return from contracting even if he expended no effort. He
would therefore have no incentive to expend effort, and the contracts would
represent an expected loss for the investor. Thus (11) reduces to
pgqgwag + pbqbw~g = e. (12)
Both the bad-signal contract and the good-signal contract must have
positive expected value for the investor. It is easy to show (see the Appendix)
that this implies that wg > w~b. It follows, in turn, that the bad-signal contract
(w~b,O) has lower expected value for the entrepreneur-and less expected cost
for the investor-than does the good-signal contract (wag,0) whatever the
likelihood of a good versus bad outcome. Since the entrepreneur cannot
observe the investor's signal, the investor therefore has an incentive to behave
opportunistically, telling the entrepreneur that the signal is bad, and offering
the entrepreneur the lower-valued bad-signal contract, even when the signal is
good. But this means that the entrepreneur's expected return from developing
a project will be, instead of (12),
pgqgw~g + pbqbw~g < e. (13)
Recognizing this in advance, the entrepreneur will have no incentive to devel-
op a project and seek a contract, and thus no projects will be undertaken,
contrary to our initial assumption.
Thus, if contracting takes place only after the entrepreneur expends effort,
there is no set of contract terms that provide efficient incentives for both the
investor and entrepreneur.
It is feasible for the investor and entrepreneur to enter into contracts after
the entrepreneur expends effort. In particular, so long as r > rain, the investor
and entrepreneur will both have an incentive to agree on the terms w.8 =
elpgqg and w. = 0 when the investor gets a good signal and no contract when
she gets a bad signal. These terms will be sufficient to induce effort by the
entrepreneur. And they will be efficient terms in general when r -- rm. But
they will result in the inefficient failure to invest in projects that yield bad
signals when main < r < rm.
It follows that, if rain < r < rmna, the investor and entrepreneur can
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contract efficiently, and thus maximize their joint return, only by contracting
in advance of the investor's signal-and by writing a contract that commits
the investor to invest regardless of her signal. In theory, it would be possible
to write this contract after the entrepreneur expends effort. But by writing the
contract before the entrepreneur expends effort it is easier to be certain that the
investor has not examined her signal before deciding whether to sign. In book
publishing, for example, the best way to guarantee that a publisher has not
evaluated the manuscript before contracting is to sign the contract before the
manuscript exists.
In short, the reason for contracting in advance of the entrepreneur's effort is
the same as the reason offered in Section 2 for putting a hands-tying provision
in the contract. Given that the entrepreneur must be compensated with a share
of profits, the investor has an incentive to use her signal to reject some
projects that represent efficient investments. Both parties will therefore prefer
to remove this incentive by committing the investor in advance to invest
regardless of her signal.
3.2 Many Investors and Entrepreneurs
It might be objected that the preceding analysis depends on the assumption
that the entrepreneur can deal with only a single investor. In a more realistic
world of multiple investors, perhaps competition would eliminate the inves-
tors' opportunism. If the first investor approached by an entrepreneur were to
report a bad signal and offer commensurately unremunerative contract terms,
the entrepreneur could take the project to a second or third investor. If in fact
the project had yielded a good signal to the first investor, other investors
would be likely to receive a good signal too and would have an incentive to
bid honestly for the project.
There is force to this argument. But the desired competitive result requires a
substantial amount of valueless activity that can be eliminated simply by
contracting in advance of the entrepreneur's effort. To see this, return to the
model under the assumptions made in Section 3.1, but assume now that (a)
there are large numbers of both investors and entrepreneurs, (b) it is costless
for an entrepreneur to submit a developed project to as many investors as he
wishes and (as before) it is costless for an investor to examine her signal for
any given project submitted to her, (c) the signals received by different inves-
tors for a given project are independent draws from the same distribution, and
(d) an investor cannot know how many other investors have examined a
project that has been submitted to her.
With these assumptions, there does exist an efficient equilibrium in which
investors and entrepreneurs contract after the entrepreneur expends effort. In
that equilibrium, each investor (i) examines her signal on every project sub-
mitted to her, (ii) offers contract terms (Ogg = elq, Ob = 0) for any proj-
ect on which she receives a good signal, and (iii) offers contract terms
(08g < e/q, Ob = 0) for any project on which she receives a bad signal. At
the same time, each entrepreneur (i) expends effort on developing each proj-
ect for which he seeks to get a contract, (ii) accepts only contracts with terms
(0 = elq, 0, = 0), and (iii) continues to resubmit a given project to addition-
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al investors until an investor receives a good signal and offers the terms
(h = elq, . = 0). With these strategies, all projects will be undertaken on
the terms (Og= e/q, ib = 0) since, sooner or later, even a bad project will
yield a good signal to some investor. All investors, moreover, will end up ac-
cepting a random draw of projects even though they are only undertaking
those for which they get good signals.
The same pattern of contracts would result if all investors simply ignored
their signals and offered the terms (wg = e/q, w. = 0) for all projects
submitted to them. The latter behavior would not, however, constitute an
equilibrium. Each investor would have an incentive to deviate by looking at
her signal and declining (or offering less favorable terms for) those projects for
which her signal is bad. In this way she could secure for herself a dispropor-
tionate share of good projects, increasing her expected profits at the expense
of the other investors. The reverse logic shows why the behavior described
in the preceding paragraph is an equilibrium. For if any individual in-
vestor were to deviate from that behavior by ignoring her signal and simply
offering (wg = e/q, wb = 0) for all projects submitted to her, she would attract
to herself a disproportionate share of bad projects and incur a loss.
In sum, when contracting takes place after the entrepreneur develops the
project rather than before, competition can avoid the inefficiencies of contract-
ing that result when, as in Section 3.1, there is only a single investor and
entrepreneur. As a consequence, an efficient contracting equilibrium is feasi-
ble. In this equilibrium, entrepreneurs commonly submit their project to mul-
tiple investors before having it accepted and investors examine signals on
more projects than they finance. Yet, in the end, all projects are undertaken on
the same terms that would be agreed to if each entrepreneur were simply to
enter into a hands-tying contract with an investor prior to developing his
project. Thus, efficiency is obtained in this equilibrium only through redun-
dant submissions by entrepreneurs and valueless examinations of signals by
investors. Under our assumption of zero transaction costs, all this activity
costs nothing. But the analysis nevertheless illustrates the critical point: If
contracting takes place only after project development by the entrepreneur,
then there are strong incentives for repeated readings of signals that have no
information value.
If, more realistically, repeated submissions and readings of signals are
costly, there is strong reason for contracting in advance of the entrepreneur's
effort. Otherwise, avoidable transaction costs will be incurred and some
worthwhile projects might not be produced. 9 Moreover, at least in this simple
9. As the number of rejections received by an entrepreneur increases, the entrepreneur will
reduce his estimate of the probability (which before the first submission equals q) that his project
is good. If the costs of submission are positive, at some point the probability of having a good
project, and thus the entrepreneur's expected returns from that project, may drop below the level
that justifies incurring the costs of further submissions. Indeed, if transaction costs are high
enough, it will not pay an entrepreneur to make even a first submission, and thus no projects at all
will be undertaken. Yet, since we are assuming here that ri,,n < r < rm, all projects are worth
undertaking if transaction costs can be avoided-as they can if contracting takes place in
advance.
642 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V8 N3
model, contracting in advance yields a first-best outcome and thus brings no
counterbalancing inefficiencies. 10
4. More about Publishing Contracts
Thus far we have employed a stylized account of contracting between authors
and publishers to illustrate circumstances in which the simple hands-tying
contract of our model might arise. In this section we demonstrate that many
terms of actual publishing contracts can be understood as responses to the
incentives analyzed in our model.
4.1 Advances
Established authors generally contract with publishers to receive generous
advances against royalties 1 on the basis of a brief outline or sketch of a
prospective manuscript. Indeed, sometimes the subject matter of the book is
left undetermined at the time of contracting,' 2 while in other cases the con-
tract is for multiple books, only the first of which has reached the proposal
stage. 13
Although large advances in such circumstances have been explained as a
means of covering the author's expenses while he writes, or as a means of
reducing the author's risk, these functions alone seem insufficient to account
for either the magnitude or the structure of advances. Large advances gener-
ally go only to established authors, who are too prosperous to need immediate
cash or to be highly risk averse. Moreover, advances generally are not paid in
full when the contract is signed. Rather, it is common either to pay half then
and the other half upon submission of the completed manuscript, or to pay
one-third on signing, one-third on submission, and one-third upon publica-
tion. These are not payment schedules designed to sustain starving authors
while they write.
A more convincing explanation for advances is that they serve to mitigate
the publisher's incentive to underinvest. A publisher who has paid a substan-
tial advance against the author's royalties receives 100 percent of the returns
from publication, rather than sharing them with the author, up to the point at
which enough copies have been sold to earn back the advance. Therefore,
when deciding whether-or, more importantly, how much-to invest in
10. Contracting in advance of completion therefore performs a role here roughly analogous to
the devices for controlling oversearching, explored in Kenney and Klein.
11. Standard royalty rates for hardcover books are 10 percent for the first 5,000 sales, 12.5
percent for the next 5,000, and 15 percent thereafter (Beil:153). These rates apply to adjusted
gross returns and involve a substantially larger share of net returns. In addition, authors receive a
return in the form of reputational enhancement, which in general is also positively correlated with
sales.
12. Thus thriller writer Ken Follett recently obtained a $12.3 million advance for two novels
about subjects "still to be determined" (Nathan:9), while Marion Brando received a $3.5 million
advance for contracting to write an autobiography without offering a written proposal (Feldman,
1991:64).
13. The best-known example is Stephen King's recent contract to write four novels for Pen-
guin USA for a reported $35 million advance (lbrbide:52).
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printing and promotion, the publisher will balance the costs of that invest-
ment, not just against her share of the returns from publication, but rather
against that share plus the author's share up to the amount advanced. Indeed,
literary agents often remark on the importance of a large advance in motivat-
ing publishers to invest heavily in promotion and a big first printing (e.g.,
Nixon: 17; Reid: 14).
In the extreme, the advance could be made equal to the author's full
expected return. This would essentially be equivalent to having the publisher
purchase the full rights to the book from the author for a fixed sum. This
would entirely eliminate the publisher's incentive to underinvest. But it would
also remove all of the author's incentive to expend (unobservable) effort in
writing the book. Therefore advances must be calculated to balance two
competing objectives: giving the publisher a stronger incentive to invest,
while not cutting too deeply into the author's incentives to write a successful
book. 14
Presumably the reason why advances are paid in full only after delivery of
the completed manuscript is to discourage the author from abandoning the
book entirely or missing important deadlines (that is, from failing to expend
observable effort). 15
4.2 Commitments to Publish
While large advances tie the publisher's hands indirectly by reducing the
incentive to underinvest, other provisions of the publishing contract tie the
publisher's hands directly.
Standard publishing contracts differ in the extent to which they commit the
publisher to publish the author's completed manuscript. Two clauses are
relevant here: the "obligation to publish" clause and the "satisfactory manu-
script" clause.
The obligation-to-publish clause sometimes clearly states that the author's
only recourse if the publisher declines to publish is to retain his advance. In
effect, such an agreement relies exclusively upon the advance to limit the
publisher's incentive to abandon mutually valuable manuscripts (Lindey:l-
57). More frequently, however, the obligation-to-publish clause does not limit
the author's remedies to retention of the advance. In this case, although the
clause is often ambiguous on its face as to whether it gives the author the right
14. Publishers must worry about the effort invested even by established authors. For example,
publishers commonly offer prominent authors bonuses when books rise to the upper reaches of the
best-seller lists (Turbide:52) and give lower advances, offset by higher royalty rates, when
authors' past books have yielded disappointing results (Feldman, 1989:42).
15. Conversely, there are advantages to having at least some of the advance paid upon signing
the contract. For one thing, it discourages publishers from breaching before or at the time of the
author's completion of the manuscript by providing, in effect, minimal liquidated damages for the
author (for whom a suit against the publisher for specific performance or even damages may be
unavailable or impractical). For another, it puts publishers in a much stronger position, as a
practical matter, to enjoin the author from contracting with another publisher for the same book
rather than fulfilling his initial contract.
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to insist upon publication, 16 it is conventionally understood to do so in the
industry.17 Such a clause, therefore, is effectively a hands-tying provision,
regardless of whether it is enforced primarily by the threat of lawsuit or by
reputational sanctions.
1 8
Yet the commitment to publish is conditioned on the author's submission of
an acceptable manuscript under a second provision, the satisfactory manu-
script clause, which commonly requires a completed manuscript that is "satis-
factory in form and content [to the publisher]." Like the obligation-to-publish
clause, this clause is ambiguous. At one extreme, it can be interpreted to
require simply that the completed manuscript meet an "objective" standard of
professional competence (e.g., House; Fowler). At the other extreme, it has
been interpreted to give the publisher legal authority to reject any manuscript
at will (Reid). Under the latter reading, of course, the publisher's hands would
not be tied as a legal matter, and a publisher who finds a manuscript "un-
satisfactory" might even be able to recover advance payments already made to
the author under some formulations of the satisfactory manuscript clause
(Reid).
Publishers have strongly resisted efforts by the Authors Guild to eviscerate
the satisfactory manuscript clause by deleting from it any reference to the
"content" of the manuscript (Reid). Thus, even prominent authors apparently
face some risk that publishers will reject their manuscripts. However, it also
appears that reputable publishers invoke the satisfactory manuscript clause
against established authors only in egregious cases. 19 Whatever its possible
legal construction, this clause is understood by agents and publishers as
protecting only against an obligation to publish wholly "unpublishable" work
rather than as a broad license to reject manuscripts of marginal economic
promise (Reid).
In practice, then, the satisfactory manuscript clause merely imposes an
outer limit on the publisher's hands-tying commitment. This limit can be
easily understood through an alternative interpretation of the investor's signal
in our model. We assumed in Section 2 that the signal (here the publisher's
reading of a manuscript) has a fixed reliability of r that is known ex ante.
Alternatively, however, we could assume that the reliability of the investor's
signal is variable and that when the investor receives her signal, she receives
16. The Random house form contract, for example, merely states that the publisher "shall
publish" a delivered manuscript satisfying the conditions of the contract. (Lindey:l-17). An
alternative provision (Lindey: 1-56) allows the author to retain his advance in the event of a failure
to publish "without prejudice to any other remedies he may have."
17. Interview with Kathy Saideman, agent with Sandra Dijkstra Literary Agency.
18. We are not concerned here with how the commitment to publish is enforced but with
whether it is enforced. The fact that this clause is commonly accepted as binding is evidence that
it is enforced. Although no court has ordered the publication of a manuscript based on such a
clause, it has been held that authors can recover their expected royalties as measured by pub-
lishers' projections or the performance of comparable books (Lindey:1-19).
19. Thus, one prominent editor claims to have rejected a manuscript under this clause only
once during his publishing career (Reid). Our conversations with representatives of a trade
publisher and a literary agency confirmed that the clause is rarely invoked.
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two pieces of information: The first is a prediction, s = sg or s = sb, about the
outcome of the project, and the second is an indication, r, of the reliability of
the prediction. The investor would then have an incentive to reject projects
whenever r > rmin, which would lead to inefficient outcomes whenever
rmin < r < rma. This means that the parties would have an incentive to write
a hands-tying contract binding the investor to ignore her signal unless r >
rrm . A natural interpretation of the satisfactory manuscript clause is that it
establishes an rma, above which the publisher is free to act on her negative
signal.
4.3 Further Hands-Tying Provisions
The obligation-to-publish clause merely commits the publisher to print the
book in some fashion, leaving the publisher free to determine the magnitude
of her investment. Consequently, established authors sometimes obtain further
contractual commitments from the publisher fixing the publisher's minimal
expenditure on promotion or even the size of the first printing (Lindey:1-19;
Bunnin:36-7). 20 Similarly, authors seek assurances that their books will re-
main in print and will not be placed on remainder lists prematurely (Bun-
nin:45-7). Indeed, even in the absence of such provisions, courts are sensitive
to publishers' incentives to "privish" books-that is, to "mount a wholly
inadequate merchandising effort after concluding that a book does not meet
prior expectations" 2 1-and therefore impose a minimal good-faith obligation
on publishers to allow books "a reasonable chance of achieving market
success."
22
4.4 Television Program Development
In the entertainment industry, network commitments for the development of
television comedy or drama series also reflect the importance of established
track records for hands-tying contracts. Typically, the "concept" for a new
series is offered-or "pitched"-to a network by a team that includes a
producer, a writer, and occasionally acting talent as well. The network must
then decide whether, and how far, to finance the development of the series. 23
Most producers and writers receive at most limited funding for script develop-
20. Informal inquiries suggest that promotional guarantees begin to appear when authors'
advances are in the range of $50,000 to $100,000. Promotional plans and print runs are among
the key features of the "packages" offered by competing publishers when top authors put up their
prospective books for auction (lbrbide:53).
We recognize that there may be other incentives, unrelated to those explored here, for an author
to seek a promotional budget commitment. In particular, some of the benefits from promoting an
author's current book may spill over onto other books that the author publishes in the future, and
thus redound to the benefit of the author but not the publisher. Such promotional spillovers among
books may be one reason why publishers and authors find it attractive to sign multi-book
contracts.
21. Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 717 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir. 1983) (Winter, J.).
22. Id. at 680. The Zilg opinion explicitly notes the asymmetric stakes facing publishers and
authors. Id. at 679.
23. Interview with Loma J. Soroko, Vice President, Adam Productions, Inc.
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ment in exchange for granting the network the right to license the prospective
series. Such an arrangement is a contract without hands-tying, since it gives
little assurance that a developed script will, after inspection, lead to actual
filming, much less to a slot in the network's programming. In contrast, better-
established producers and writers may obtain not only funding for script
development but also an advance commitment for the filming of a pilot
episode of the proposed series. Moreover, the best-established producers or
superstar actors can sometimes obtain a multimillion dollar, multi-episode
commitment from a network without first presenting either a script or a pilot
episode (Rosenbloom: 117).24 Once a network has invested heavily in such a
multi-episode commitment, its incentive to give the series the air time neces-
sary to become profitable is greatly enhanced. Thus, the multi-episode com-
mitment plays a hands-tying role similar to a guaranteed promotional budget
or print run in the publishing industry.
5. Some Additional Applications
Publishing is just one of many settings in which hands-tying appears. We
focus here briefly on several others.
5.1 Venture Capital Financing
One example is the standard financing arrangement between a venture cap-
italist and the founder or entrepreneur of a start-up firm. Here the firm itself is
the project. The entrepreneur, like the author in the publishing example,
contracts with the venture capitalist to expend effort in developing a novel
product; and the venture capitalist, like the publisher, undertakes to finance
the entrepreneur's efforts. The agreement between the parties typically pro-
vides for the entrepreneur to receive common stock that gives him a portion of
the profits in case the firm succeeds, thus creating a strong inceritive for effort.
The venture capitalist, in turn, is commonly issued convertible preferred stock
that, while also providing her with a share of the profits if the firm succeeds,
gives a superior claim on remaining assets if the firm fails. Given that the
venture capitalist provides all of the firm's financing, one might expect her to
retain voting control so that she can limit her losses by liquidating the firm
should subsequent information suggest an increased likelihood of its eventual
failure. Yet retaining such control would be equivalent to a contract without
hands-tying in the publishing example. Because the venture capitalist bears all
the risk that remaining assets will be lost if the firm fails, but receives only a
portion of the gains if the firm succeeds, she has an excessive incentive to
abandon the firm and salvage any remaining assets upon receipt of unfavora-
ble information-much like a disappointed publisher might wish to abandon a
manuscript on the basis of an unfavorable reading.
This is presumably important in explaining why venture capitalists often do
not receive voting control over start-up firms, even when they require some
24. For example, Bill Cosby and his agent, the William Morris Agency, received a seven-
episode predevelopment commitment from NBC for "The Bill Cosby Show" without any prior
script development (Katzman and Soroko:7).
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representation on the board. The financing agreement generally leaves the
founder with a control block of common stock that carries the power to
manage the firm (Larson:208; Hewitt and Ruhm:194-5). The preferred stock
issued to the firm's investors typically carries voting rights but lacks sufficient
votes to dismiss the founder or control decision-making. In short, the inves-
tors' hands are tied.25
A hands-tying motive in the allocation of control over start-up firms may
also be found in other provisions of venture capital financings that limit
investors' exposure to loss by adjusting the size of capital contributions. For
example, entrepreneurs sometimes allow investors to choose between funding
*a firm's entire business plan at a low share price or funding only the initial
stages of the plan at the low share price with the option to purchase additional
shares somewhat later at a higher price (Clayton:37). In effect, this strategy
offers a choice between contracting with or without a hands-tying commit-
ment. If the investor funds the entire business plan by purchasing cheap shares
at the outset, she cannot withhold investment from the plan's later stages on
the basis of unfavorable information; her hands are tied. If instead the investor
funds only the plan's initial stages, she retains the right to withhold funds
from its later stages-and thus retains an informal veto over the project-but
only upon agreeing to pay a higher total price for the same ownership interest
in the firm if future information indicates that the project is likely to succeed.
In this case she contracts without hands-tying, regardless of the formal alloca-
tion of voting control.
26
5.2 Venture Capital Firms
An even more conspicuous form of hands-tying appears in the structure of the
limited partnerships formed to supply venture capital financing. The general
partners in these firms are individuals who, though supplying only around
1 percent of the firm's capital, have nearly complete operating control over the
partnership, including choice of the start-up firms in which to invest the
partnership's funds. The institutions and individuals who provide the bulk of
the partnership's funds, in turn, are limited partners who commit themselves
at the outset to maintain their investment for the life of the partnership, which
is typically 10 years, and are subject to a substantial penalty for withdrawal,
commonly including forfeiture of one-half of their capital account (Sahl-
man:490-1).
25. The venture capitalists' preferred stock commonly has the right to additional votes-
enough to establish control over the firm-if and when the firm fails to meet certain specified
performance objectives. This voting trigger, which limits the extent to which the venture cap-
italists' hands are tied, might be analogized to the satisfactory-manuscript clause in publishing
contracts.
26. In many start-up firms it is anticipated that the venture capitalists will invest additional
funds at several points during the firm's early development. The hands-tying motive may shed
light on the timing or number of financing stages. Ideally, new capital will be required-and
hence the venture capitalists will have an effective veto-only when available information has
become sufficiently reliable to allow investors to make a jointly optimal decision about whether to
proceed (i.e., when r > rmax)-
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These firms closely follow the structure reflected in our model. The general
partners (corresponding to the entrepreneur in our model) identify and oversee
the start-up firms to which the partnership contributes capital. As compensa-
tion, they receive, beyond a base salary, a share-generally between 15
percent and 30 percent-of the firm's profits (Sahlman:491). This compensa-
tion structure is presumably arranged to provide strong incentives for the
general partners to expend effort in locating attractive investments and
monitoring them well. Allowing the limited partners (the investor) discretion
to withhold or withdraw at will the funds they have promised would invite
them to neglect the general partners' share of prospective profits when decid-
ing whether to continue. That is, the limited partners might withdraw their
investment when the prospects of the partnership as a whole, or of specific
individual investments, appeared insufficient to provide the limited partners
with an adequate return, even though the returns remained attractive for the
partnership as a whole.
27
5.3 Oil and Gas Limited Partnerships
By contrast with venture capital firms, in limited partnerships formed for oil
and gas exploration it is the general partners rather than the limited partners
who must have their hands tied to prevent them from underinvesting.
For tax avoidance purposes, oil and gas partnerships are commonly struc-
tured so that the limited partners supply all of the capital for the initial drilling
of a well while the general partners who control the firm provide all the capital
for the final completion stage in which the well is brought into production.
The gross returns from a completed well, however, are divided between both
types of partners. As a result, the general partners have a considerably larger
share in the costs than in the returns from completion of wells. Not surprising-
ly, there is evidence that these firms often fail to complete a well when it
appears, after the initial drilling, that the well will be only marginally profit-
able overall and thus not profitable at all for the general partners themselves.
In an effort to attract investors as limited partners on favorable terms,
general partners seek, through reputation and otherwise, to bond themselves
to the limited partners not to be influenced by this incentive for undercomple-
tion but rather to make the investments necessary to complete all wells that
promise to be jointly profitable for the partners as a group (Wolfson). In short,
they seek to tie their hands.
5.4 Secured Debt
Each of the preceding applications closely tracks the structure of our model.
In particular, all involve two parties who invest sequentially rather than simul-
taneously. (In some cases, of course, the first party's investment is in the form
of labor.) This sequencing of investments is not, however, necessary to create
the incentive for rejecting efficient projects that hands-tying agreements seek
27. The restrictions on the ability of the limited partners to withdraw might also seem to be
justified by the probable illiquidity of the partnership's investments. But, if this were their only
function, there would be no need to bar the limited partners from withholding or withdrawing
their investments in the partnership not just as individuals but also as a group.
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to control. There is a much broader class of situations that give rise to the
same basic problem-namely, how much control over a project to give to a
party who participates disproportionately in losses as opposed to gains. An
important example from this broader class is the choice between secured and
unsecured debt.
A lender can obtain substantial control over the investment policies of a
borrowing firm by requiring stringent loan covenants, by taking a security
interest in the borrower's assets, or both. In particular, a security interest can
effectively permit the lender to exercise a veto over any attempt by the bor-
rower to liquidate existing assets in order to switch to new lines of activity. It
will also limit the firm's ability to turn to other lenders to fund new invest-
ments, since the firm will be unable to offer its existing assets as security to
the new lender. Moreover if, as is common, the security interest is accom-
panied by stringent loan covenants that allow the lender to declare the bor-
rower in default more or less at will, a secured lender may obtain an effective
veto over almost any aspect of the borrower's business (Scott:925-9).
This type of control has the often-noted advantage of preventing the bor-
rower from opportunistically substituting riskier lines of business for safer
ones at the lender's expense (Smith and Wamer). 28 But, at the same time, it
can induce the inverse problem. Since a lender participates less in the firm's
upside gains than in its downside losses, she has an incentive to be excessively
conservative in permitting the borrower to enter new, jointly profitable lines
of business. Thus secured or covenanted debt comes at a potential cost
(Scott:929). Presumably this helps explain why unsecured debt is often issued
even by firms that have assets that could be pledged as security. In effect,
secured or heavily covenanted debt functions as investment without hands-
tying while long-term debt that is free of such restrictions ties the lender's
hands by permitting the debtor to continue, expand, or alter its projects
without the lender's consent. Thus, though the microstructure of this situation
differs slightly from that in our model-here the two parties invest simul-
taneously and the signal involves the likely outcome of a new project rather
than the original one-the basic issues remain the same.
The observed pattern of secured debt is, in fact, roughly what would be
predicted from our analysis. Secured debt is typically extended to small firms,
start-up businesses, 29 and distressed firms, while large and established busi-
28. Security interests also have the unrelated benefit of creating clear priorities among a firm's
various creditors, thus mitigating the common pool problem in which creditors have an incentive
to race to foreclose prematurely on the firm's assets once it faces some possibility of insolvency
(Schwartz; Picker).
29. We noted earlier that venture capitalists often tie their hands in start-up firms to the extent
of taking preferred rather than common stock. This is not inconsistent with the fact that lenders in
new firms commonly do not tie their hands. The amount of hands-tying in both cases must be
considered in relation to the other forms of protection available to the investors. The venture
capitalist, for example, ties her hands only for the period of time between financing stages, and
may also protect herself with specific performance criteria that serve as contractual triggers for
her intervention. Thus, even with her hands tied, the venture capitalist holding preferred stock
may be protected against opportunism as well as is the holder of secured debt in an equivalent
firm.
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nesses commonly obtain unsecured debt without restrictive covenants
(Scott:940-1). Put in terms of our model, for established businesses, as for
established authors, the reliability of the lender's signal may be insufficient to
justify giving her the discretion to act on it.
30
6. Conclusion
It might at first seem implausible that an investor would find it in her interest
to enter into a contract whereby she agrees to discard subsequent information
about the prospects for a project she is financing. Nevertheless, contracts of
this type are relatively common. We have examined here one circumstance
under which such contracts can be efficient-namely, when the returns to the




To compute expression (2), note that when the investor uses her signal-situa-
tion (c) in the text-there are four possible cases as shown in columns (a)-(e)
of Table 2. In case (i), the outcome will be good and the investor's signal ac-
curately takes the value s.. The ex ante probability of this result, as of the time
that the investor contracts with the entrepreneur, is p(v = vg)'p(s = sglv = vg)
= qr. The investor will invest (since s = sg), and the return from the invest-
ment will be vg. In case (ii), v = vg but the investor's signal inaccurately takes
the value sb. Cases (iii) and (iv) follow similarly. Adding across the four
cases, we get expression (2).
A.2 Contracting with Hands-Tying
To prove Equation (4), note that if the entrepreneur expends no effort, the
outcome will always be bad and his expected return will be w,. If, alter-
natively, he expends effort, his expected return will be
qwg + (1 - q)wb - e. (Al)
To motivate the entrepreneur, it is necessary that expression (Al) > w.,
that is,
q(wg - w.) - e. (A2)
30. The hands-tying model may also describe participation or loan commitment agreements
offered by lenders to would-be borrowers to cover the period in which borrowers assemble loan
documentation and attempt to meet pre-closing conditions. Presumably because lenders have an
excessive incentive to renege on such commitments upon discovering unfavorable information,
courts are sometimes skeptical of lenders who refuse to honor their commitments because bor-
rowers failed to meet pre-closing conditions. See, for example, Penthouse International Ltd. v.
Dominion Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 665 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd 855 F.2d
963 (2nd Cir. 1988).
Hands-Tying Contracts 651
Table 2. Returns when Investor's Signal Is Employed
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Entre-
Project Signal Ex Ante Investor Project preneur's Investor's
Case Value Value Probability Invests? Return Return Return
(i) V9 S9  qr yes v9 - I wg Vg - / g
(ii) V9  Sb q(1 - r) no 0 V' I
(iii) Vb Sb (1 - q)r no 0 Wn-W
(iv) vb S 9  (1 - q)(1 - r) yes Vb -I b Vb I L'Itb
The investor wishes to minimize the expected payments to the entrepreneur,
qwg + (1 - q)w,, (A3)
subject to (A2). To obtain the appropriate values for wg and wb, we can treat
(A2) as an equality and use it to solve for wg in terms of wb. Substituting the
resulting value for wg into (A3), we can solve for the value of wb that
minimizes (A3) subject to wb -- 0, which is wb = 0. We then use (A2), as an
equality, to solve for wg in terms of w., giving wg = e/q.
Given that the entrepreneur expends effort, the investor's expected return is
q(vg - wg) - (1 - q)(vb + wb). (A4)
Substituting from Equations (4), we get expression (5).
A.3 Contracting without Hands-Tying
To establish Equations (6), note first that the entrepreneur's expected return if
he expends no effort is
rl>,, + (1 - r)t-'b. (A5)
Alternatively, if the entrepreneur expends effort, there are the four possible
cases that appear in Table 2. Columns (f) and (g) of that table show the returns
to the entrepreneur and the investor, respectively, for the payment structure
involved here. Adding across the four cases, the entrepreneur's expected
return as of the time of contracting with the investor is
qrvg + q(1 - r)O,, + (1 - q)r,, + (1 - q)(1 - r)Ob - e. (A6)
An entrepreneur will accept employment only if expression (A6) -- 0 and will
expend effort only if expression (A6) -- expression (A). The investor's
objective is therefore to minimize (A6) subject to the conditions (A6) -- 0,
(A6) - (A), and h,,,O,Og - 0.
Because W,,,Wf ,g => 0, it follows that (A5) 0. Thus (A6) -- 0 if (A6)>
(AS). We can therefore ignore (A6) -- 0 as a separate constraint.
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Suppose hb > 0. Then (A5),(A6) > 0. By reducing wb, we reduce (A6).
This is an improvement unless the result would be that (A6) < (A5). But the
latter could happen only if, at the initial value of WCb, (A6) = (A5) and
d(A6)Id1b > d(A5)/db. Yet
d(A6) _ (1 - q)(1 - r) < (1 - r) = d(A5) (A7)
dob dob A
Thus O>b > 0 cannot be a solution. Since Wb 
- 0, it must be that Wb = 0.
Similar logic establishes that 0,, = 0. Consequently, (A5) = 0 and (A6) =
qrv, - e. Minimizing the latter with respect to rg, subject to (A6) -- (A5) =
0, gives Og = e/qr.
To establish expression (7), we add, for the four cases in Table 2, the
product of the investor's return from column (g) and the probability in column
(c). This yields
qr(vg - I - Og) - (1 - q)r - q(1 - r)
+ (1 - q)(1 - r)(vb - I - Wh). (A8)
Substituting from (6), we then get (7).
A.4 When Does Hands-Tying Pay?
To see when a hands-tying provision is needed, suppose that an entrepreneur
contracted on the assumption that the investor would not act on her signal, and
thus agreed to the terms of compensation given by (4). And suppose that the
contract did not tie the investor's hands, but left her free to reject projects
without making any payment to the entrepreneur (or, equivalently, required
only that the investor pay the entrepreneur ,, = 0 upon rejecting a project, as
under the contract without hands-tying). The investor's expected return, if she
were to proceed to reject projects whenever s = sb, would then be
qr(v, - I - w.) + (1 - q) (1 - r)(vb - I - wb)= qr(v, - I) + (1 -q)(1 - r)(vt, - I) - re. (A9)
This expression is equivalent to (A8) but with wg [the payment from (4) that
the entrepreneur would accept with hands-tying] substituted for 'g, Wb
substituted for Wb, and w,, = 0 substituted for 0,
The investor would then reject projects on the basis of her signal if (A9) >
(A4), that is, if
-(1 - q)r(vb - I) > q(1 - r)(vg - I - wg). (A10)
The left-hand side of (A10) is the investor's gain from avoiding the losses of
bad projects that her signal permits her to screen out. The right-hand side of
(A10) is the investor's loss from mistakenly rejecting good projects. The latter
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figure is less than the full social loss from rejecting good projects by the
amount q(1 - r)wg, which is the loss in expected value that the entrepreneur
suffers from the investor's rejection of good projects. That is, in deciding
whether to reject projects, the investor will ignore the loss that the en-
trepreneur may suffer as a result.
After substituting for wg from (4), (A10) can be rewritten as a condition on
r, giving (10).
A.5 Why Contract in Advance?
To prove that, as asserted in Section 3.1 of the text, wg > wb, we first need the
values forp9 and pb---the probabilities, respectively, that the investor will get
a good (bad) signal on a randomly selected project:
p9 = qr + (1 - q)(1 - r), (All)
pb = q(1 - r) + (1 - q)r. (A12)
Likewise, for q9 and qb-the probabilities, respectively, that a project will
have a good outcome given that the investor gets a good (bad) signal-we
have the values
q9 = qrl[qr + (1 - q)(1 - r)], (A13)
qb = q(1 - r)/[q(l - r) + (1 - q)r]. (A14)
Denote by R9 (Rb) the investor's expected net return from offering the good-
(bad-) signal contract after receiving a good (bad) signal, that is,
R8 = qg(v, - wg) + (1 - qg)vb - I, (A15)
Rb = qb(Vg - W~g) + (1 - qb)vb - I. (A16)
If the investor is to offer either contract, it must have a nonnegative expected
return for her. Thus, R-,Rb _ 0. For a randomly selected project, the inves-
tor's expected surplus is
S = p9R9 + pbRb. (A17)
Solving (A15) and (A16) for wgg and wb and substituting from (A13) and
(A14), we have
Wg = vg - + R9 - (1 - qr)vb]lqr,  (A18)
wg = vg - [I + Rb - (1 - q(1 - r))vb]Iq(l - r). (A19)
Subtracting (A19) from (A18) and rearranging yields
W, - wb ( - vb) (2 r - 1) (1 - q) + rS - pgRg (A20)g qr(l- r)
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Since, from (A17), p9Rg - S, by substituting S forpgRg in the right-hand side
of (A20) we get the inequality.
w9, - w b ->(--v,) (2r - 1) (1 - q) - (1 - r)S (A21)
g g qr(1 - r)
The numerator of (A21) is positive whenever r > rmin. Thus wg > w~g.
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